I think a cursory glance at the galnet would show that many who are born and raised into such circumstances can still find it difficult to navigate at times. One thing is clear, no one’s path is ever easy.
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The Caldari have something similar, though, Veik.
The Great Families? The “Chief Executive” caste? You can have your officers be whoever you want, but for the actual megacorporate head you want the great-great-grandchild of Tovil Toba or something.
Some of those are probably just figureheads being steered around by the board, but some aren’t. And I expect some Amarrian Holders get piloted around by somebody, too.
Well said. The Amarr system of government has always struck me as lacking in multiple areas, but the Empire’s sheer size and momentum gives it enough leeway to make corrections before enough errors are made to inflict fatal damage.
There is far more truth to this than I like. Even a dedication to excellence and efficiency still clashes with basic human nature, and those in power are often unwilling to give it up even when it’s in the best interests of their group.
In truth, many Minmatar clans operate in the similar ways. Mine for example. The position of Clan Chief is a hereditary one that is passed on within my family. That said, just because some one is ‘next in line’ doesn’t mean they will automatically assume the role - they need to be vetted and approved by the clan families before they can assume responsibility. From their there is a need to continue to keep the confidence of the family heads to maintain it.
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Even the children of the Great Families are not exempt from the expectations of society, or free from the shame of failure in duty.
Also, while there are certainly positions within Amarr that were created as recognitions of the excellence a family rather than an individual, there are many other positions that are based upon an individual’s achievements.
An inquisitor who might not be from illustrious ancestry might very well have authority over people that come from the most noble backgrounds.
But as I see it, placing one’s self before duty to the divine order is the absolute core of the Sani Sabik heresy.
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Mine works the same. Down to the fact of it being my family.
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It is a common mischaracterization that Amarr hold to the belief that simply “born into a position, qualifies as being fit to rule by default”. That is not the case.
Yes, there are hereditary positions, that are handed on to the next generation. But if it’d be simply about being born into a position, the rule to determine the inheriting person would probably being primogeniture or some comparably simple rule. But that is not the case:
A holders titles are passed from a Holder to his designated heir. Most often that is one of his children, but that doesn’t need to be the case. What is really needed is that the inheriting person is of nobility and has been named heir. And before someone is raising the issue that this means that someone has been born into nobility: No, the inheritor could very well have been ennobled after his birth.
A heir is usually chosen once they had a good time (a few decades at least) to show his colours and prove themselves. Amarr are usually not hasty on such decision. The aim is to find someone who is able and of the right fibre to fill the vacant spot. As children usually reproduce to some extent the characteristics of their parents, it is only pragmatic to first look amongst ones children - whom one also usually knows quite intimately - for someone who is a good fit.
In summary, even if we in the Amarr Empire are not as fast in removing people from their positions as, say, the Federation - where people are removed from office even before they could prove their qualities for reasons that might not even be under their control - people do get removed from their position if they prove time and again that they don’t uphold their duties - as the Tetrimon example shows most glaringly.
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I would characterize loyalty as a practical disposition to persist in an intrinsically valued (though not necessarily valuable) associational attachment, where that involves a potentially costly commitment to secure or at least not to jeopardize the interests or well-being of the object of loyalty.
There are feelings that may or may not accompany such a practical disposition. And if we talk about loyalty to ones relatives and extended realtives then they usually are accompanied by such feelings. It is a sign that humans, by their very nature, are geared towards the social, that there is an instinct to sociability. But, I’d argue, that those feelings are not constitutive of loyalty, even if it is unusual to find loyalty that is affectless.
Arguably, the test of loyalty is conduct rather than intensity of feeling, primarily a certain “stickingness” or perseverance—the loyal person acts for or stays with or remains committed to the object of loyalty even when it is likely to be disadvantageous or costly to the loyal person to do so. And there are people who feel loyalty who fail to do so, while there are people who don’t have deep feelings of loyalty who uphold their loyalties in the face of adversity.
Now, if I am right and loyalty is about associational attachments, then loyalty should be properly addressed towards persons, personal collectivities, or quasi-persons such as organizations or social groups, right? How then, does it come that we talk about loyalty to such abstract things as positions and offices? This is quite easy to answer: We hold loyalty to such positions and offices, because we are loyalty to the groups in which such positions and offices are embedded. For the group to function properly, there needs to be loyalty to those positions (or offices) from both the people that hold it as well as those that fill it.
But what about such thing as loyalty to principles, causes, brands, ideas, ideals, and ideologies? I think in answer to this, one needs to make a deeper point about the nature of loyalty which we hold towards persons:
In identifying with the object of our loyalty, there is usually implicit in our loyalty a judgment that its object meshes with that for which we stand. That is, embedded in those associations to which our loyalty is given are certain presumptions about the compatibility of the basic values attributable to the object of loyalty with those to which we are committed (not that the values themselves are what ground the loyalty, for that might suggest that the loyalty is to the values). To the extent that we discover it to be otherwise we have a reason for taking some action—either to try to bring about a change in the object of our loyalty (‘giving voice’) or to abandon it (‘exit option’) on the ground that it has forfeited its claim to our loyalty. There may, of course, be some sort of persistence of loyalty despite a recognition that the object of loyalty is no longer worthy of it. In such cases, the loyalty seems to ride on some commitment to an associational ideal (“He will always be our son.”). Nevertheless, though it may sometimes appear to allow for attributions of loyalty to the supposedly embedded values, our loyalty is primarily to the affiliational object or person, and not to the particular values that it instantiates. The loyalty is to the object of an association or relationship , that is, the person or collectivity-in-relation.
Now, if that is true, then what are the values on which we are justified to use the ‘giving voice’ or the ‘exit option’? That is a very difficult question, but suffice to say - without drifting to deep into theology, Amarr solved it thusly: If there is an entity which is the ultimate arbiter of what is good and evil, which is all-good and doesn’t change in being such, then we have a foundation in which we can trust to put our loyalty without need to fear for it being or becoming unworthy of that loyalty. If we then put our loyalty in that entity first and foremost, we can establish a well-ordered hierarchy of loyalties, that allows us to make proper decisions about the relations we have to other persons and whether they merit loyalty.
This is pretty much in agreement with has been said earlier, it seems:
I humbly tried to show why one would want to have such a hierarchy. But that’s exactly why I have to disagree with Lord Lok’ri. Though some people might accuse me of nitpicking, I hold to the conviction that although the distinction might be small, it is of great importance:
The Amarr concept isn’t that ‘it all’ stems from a single divine origin (exept in the sense that God created the cosmos). As empirically, loyalty can be found among non-belivers, pagans, apostates and one could argue even one can find it in a well-trained Syricose hound. It’s not the concept but the justification of loyalty that makes God so central to loyalty:
Justified loyalty is all about God.
And this is also why proper procedure can’t be an absolute, even though it is of great import: Proper procedure is ‘just’ a type of loyalty to a human institution. It can be service to God, but only if the procedures in that institution are set up the right way.
Whether we should follow proper procedure is conditional on whether it is embodying the Will of God. The example of St. Tetrimon is illustrating that - as I alluded to in my previous post. Also, that means that procedures, even if followed properly, might get into conflict with other procedures. But there is a method to decide when to follow one and not the other: By assessing which is in accord to God’s will and then following that. This is how conflict in procedure can be solved.
Of course, that allows for disagreements within the Amarr Empire. But, I don’t see that as something that is problematic, as it also gives us a way to contain those disagreements and work them out - or even work with them. It allows for prima facie conflicting positions to coexist in the Empire, if on close inspection they reveal themselves to be rather complimentary approaches, which need to be expressed at the same time, though maybe to varying degrees, for the best results to be realized. That is only reasonable.
Loyalty, in the Empire, isn’t a simple thing. It can’t be understood in terms of ‘all the same’, for Emperors are succeded, Heirs are of differing families, Families have branches and so on and so forth. Or, to speak in metaphor: Those that picture the Empire as a giant Monolith all too ready forget that monoliths are aggregates of minerals or mineraloid matter. Each mineral contributing to the properties of the monolith, depending of where it is and how it interacts with others. Akin to that are the different roles that different persons, personal collectivities, or quasi-persons fill within the Empire and each are showing their loyalty according to the role they fulfill.
And so loyalty is an aggregate matter in the Empire, bound together by common Faith in God. On that much I can agree with Lord Lok’ri and I doubt much more is needed.
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That is still anathema to me. Even in cases where a person is ennobled, that still doesn’t mean they can become Empress or Emperor on their own merits. This is contrasted to people such as Haatakan Oiritsuu who was born into the lower working classes and rose to the top as CEO of Kaalakiota on her own merits and ability. While ennobling notable individuals who perform well is meritocratic, the vast majority of nobility in the Empire were born into that position. For me, I can feel no loyalty to someone who was just born into their station with silver spoon in mouth who didn’t earn that position through their own merit.
It’s not just about the heirs to the family, though. There is the heir, of course, who will virtually always be chosen from a member of the family. And then the rest of the family, will often be chosen for other occupations. Governors of provinces or cities, positions in court, military commanders, and so on.
Choice for these roles will almost always start within the family first. Only if there is no suitable candidate (which is based entirely around whether or not the Holder and the family leaders deem there to be someone suitable, not if they are actually merited or not), then will outsiders be looked at. And even then, the choices will still frequently go to those of higher influence and status, as rewards for their loyalty (or incentives to stay or become loyal), rather than someone of lesser standing but higher qualifications.
Indeed.
If it is not in accordance with the will of God, it is not proper procedure.
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I’d hold that ‘proper procedure’ means that a ‘procedure’ - a particular method for performing a task - is ‘proper’ - follwoing the established and accepted standards for performing that task.
Of course, proper procedure within the Empire aims at being in accordance with the Will of God. But it is too strict a requirement for procedure to be proper, that it needs to be actually in accord with the Will of God.
No procedure can be framed aright in all its details; for any procedure must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. But the Will of God must by necessity be aright in all its details. Thus no procedure can be in accord with the Will of God - at least not fully. If not fully, though, then it can’t be absolute and again, wether one should follow it in any particular circumstance is conditional on whether it is embodying the Will of God in those particular circumstances.
Again, that is not to diminish the great importance of proper procedure. Yet, it is to put it into perpective to the ineffable Will of God, which is primary and and singular.
I certainly agree with you there. Considering how splintered our people truly are, and how many of them look only to their own tribes and their own circles, I agree that loyalty to a rank, title, or even a higher cause is not in the nature of the Minmatar people.
We’re loyal to our circles, our tribes, our families, our immediate environments, not to distant overlords or higher purposes. With effort, we sometimes manage it anyway to come together for a higher purpose and a shared ideal, based on the glories of the past. But I don’t think it is in our nature.
In most gatherings I feel like the most uncompromising Minmatar in the room, and I’ve come to believe it might be exactly because of my Amarr upbringing that it is so. Because from them I learned their ideals of loyalty, to a leader, a nation, a higher purpose, and to moral codes.
The idea of taking the chains the Amarr placed upon me and beating them to death with it is a thought I relish every day.
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My conception of loyalty is my duty: when I put on my uniform in service to Kaalakiota Corporation and the State I signed a contract to defend my people, and their interests as my duty. You don’t break a contract just because it’s difficult, or you wish things were different. You can still disagree with those who you fight for; or stand up for your principles but in the end you should still do your job.
In such a way I believe I live an honourable life, a life worth dying for.
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Indeed.
And if you disagree to a degree you can’t do the job, you still do the job and then take your own life as a sign of disagreement. That’s Caldari way.
Only weaklings and cowards run from the duty. Traitors in the State are rare, they cause huge resonance and their names become known everywhere, hated and used as synonyms to traitor.
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Those who betray their duty to their people and nation have only betrayed themselves by placing selfish desires over the collective common good.
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