There is only 1 proper answer to this heresy…the Inquisition
It wasn’t supposed too.
Applying voting theory to the CSM is kind of silly when we get right down to it. The CSM is nothing more than an advisory board. A way of giving players some degree of a voice with the Devs…that the Devs can heed, ignore or something in between. The CSM has no power at all.
So this idea of “distributing power” is just errant nonsense…there is no power to distribute, not in the sense of an actual legislature that actually votes on plicy.
The CSM does not lead. It cannot lead. It can, at most, advise. CCP leads. It can listen to the CSM, ignore the CSM or something in between. Stop confusing this with actual voting.
Are they deterministic? I am not at all sure that is the case. And even if they are, the idea of Arrow’s theorem is that there is no well defined social welfare function. Arrow was an economist. He was interested in seeing if voting could give rise to a social welfare function much like an individual’s utility function. If the answer were yes, then voting could give us a mechanism for determining optimal collective choice problems analogous to the market process. His answer was in the negative, that there is no such thing as a social welfare function.
What does that mean? That the idea that there is a “will of the people” is really a will-o-the-wisp. That it does not exist. And if that is the case, then there is nothing particularly special about any given electoral outcome. So we should stop talking about voters as if they were a single individual. When someone ways, “The people have spoken and want X” Arrow’s theorem says that is, generally speaking garbage talk.
Of course much of this applies to voting systems without constraints as well. For example, if one were to read Buchanan and Congleton they spend a great deal of time on how to constrain voting so that it is positive sum–i.e. it eliminates zero sum outcomes and negative sum outcomes. But to do this it must be done by constraining the set of potential choices and that people must agree, ex ante, to such constraints usually via a unanimity rule in terms of changing the voting rules themselves.
I think there may very well be a subset of Trump voters from 2016 who now regret their vote. For example, people who thought that Trump’s rhetoric regarding a trade war was just mere rhetoric are now regretting that vote. So yes, it is quite likely that their vote was probabilistic and not deterministic.
Ordinal utility does not contradict deterministic voting. All ordinal says is that people can rank order their preferences, but that they cannot provide a statement in terms of how much they prefer something. That is ordinal utility theory says Bob prefers X to Y, but says nothing in terms of how much Bob prefers X to Y. Basically, Arrow was assuming that people are the same in terms of political decision making as they are in terms of making decisions over consumer goods.
Yes, which is something I noted a few posts ago.
Which is what Arrow’s theorem is telling us. Arrow’s theorem is telling us that in terms of voting we should consider using game theory and in game theory there are a plethora of (Nash) equilibria and there is nothing that ensures any (Nash) equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal…in fact games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma can have (Nash) equilibria that are decidedly undesirable.
But is there a cycle? After all, NS and in particular Goons tend do well in the elections. This suggests that Goon candidates may very well be Condorcet winners. If this is the case then cycling is not really an issue.
Further, in the example you’ve set up,
There is no winner in terms of majority rule. So, if there are pairwise elections that is where we see the cyclical nature of voting…or if one can control the pairwise matches a manipulation of the pairwise matches to get a specified outcome…but we don’t have pairwise matches.
In other words, if a particular voting block is winning routinely between different votes then it suggests that there is a Condorcet winner and Condorcet’s paradox does not hold.
Sorry to burst your bubble.
Not very useful then.
The entire thread is not to help you pick candidates, but given your preferences over candidates what can be expected of various voting mechanisms in terms of a social welfare function and the answer is: not very much.
So yeah…voting is not really all that awesome despite all the romantic ■■■■■■■■ attached to voting.
I keep telling people this and that violent revolution is the way, but they keep putting the phone down.
You say they have no power, but they have influenced the games direction a few times. So to say they do not have any power is BS.
This theory concept isn’t my own, it was noticed, marked and analysed by many scientists over a century now. I just informed everybody on this EVE forum that there is a voting paradox in this kind of elections, how it’s working, how it can bring a contradicting result (more frequent than most people thoughts) and why it’s bad for CSM elections. Therefore, you didn’t burst my bubble, - you just threw another “smokescreen” grenade in another thread.
Firstly. I didn’t wrote anything about that the paradox will happen always with a 100% probability as none of those scientists wrote such texts. In your previous post, you stated that the paradox will not happen for probabilistic voting models and there exists the Nakamura number, which measures the degree of rationality of preference aggregation rules (collective decision rules). If the number of alternatives (candidates; options) to choose from is less than this number, then the rule in question will identify “best” alternatives without any problem and vice versa. In my previous post, I pointed to the true condition when a voting model will be affected by the Arrow’s theorem - it can happen in ordinal utility models, under which most voting processes happen. While in mathematics and gaming, the numbers are mainly defined by cardinal utility, which also means their probabilistic order. You are right, that every election there is a part of voters which will give their votes completely randomly (means probabilistic). Therefore, including this and a lot of tricks, used during real elections (human factor), it’s hard to align the CSM as totally affected by Arrow’s theorem or vice versa due to the Nakamura number. Due to this dual status of available votes/individuals and a complex structure of formed coalitions (subsets of individuals) it’s hard to calculate this number at all and especially with minimal error… I didn’t saw any Nakamura number which prove that the CSM14 was elected perfectly.
Secondly. The Condorcet paradox happens not only when a candidate with most votes in Round 1 lose the final/overall distribution of votes, but when we have a “cyclic” order - when it’s not possible to determine the winner, no matter that there is a candidate with most votes. To solve this issue the STV voting model was invented to sort out the cyclic situation by using quota-preferential proportional representation. Just download the CSM14 voting final results, if you didn’t it yet, and look over those numbers from round to round. Yes, the candidate Aryth is a Condorcet winner with the most amount of votes. Is Goonswarm, as a group or coalition, a Condorcet winner? I’d not say yes. It would be enough changing the distribution of votes at least a little, and Innominate would be out. Is Goonswarm a Condorcet winner in this case? No! For sure, by having 7200 voters and five candidates to get elected only two of them. Candidates with more votes than quota are Condorcet winners, while those under that number - I’d say no - they are affected by Condorcet paradox. For example, Exookiz and Sort Dragon have exactly 1500 votes during round 1, which is a cycle condition in elections for 6 seats. It’s not possible to describe and handle every practical situation which leads to these numbers to show their value.
Yes, Goonswarm respresents a majority group. But … Does it means that H-Sec players are minorities at the same time? Are the H-Sec players a minority because half of them are Alpha-accounts and other part haven’t political in game interests and are distributed between corporations? H-Sec has 1090 systems. During my travelling I noticed around 7-10 players per system during my time zone on average bassis. So, roughly calculated, we have at least 10900 individual players in H-Sec, which prefer their game play style. We know about Wardecs, ganking, Citadel debates. Is this means that Structures in H-Sec should work as they work in SOV-space, as they are aligned by N-Sec dwellers in later patches?
So, this model allows a candidate with low number of votes to be elected on one side, and allows a majority coalition to get even more seats by absorbing votes of other candidates on the other hand.
The main question is “How good or acceptable is this voting system in different scenarios?”. How good is to have a parachute with probability of operation of 75%? Don’t worry! It will work mainly, but sometimes it will not work. When the word “sometime” can be acceptable? When its value is: 50%, 40%, 30%, 20%, 1%. It reminds me one good enough movie “Minority Report (2002)”.
Firstly. Define your life qualities and a candidate supporting them.
As in real life, try to determine your interests, your life qualities, your life style, and vote for a candidate which will at least support this life style and/or will improve it. For example, you’ll not be likely to vote for a candidate (as I imagine), which will promise to build the biggest pyramid in human history. But for this you and all citizens should work for 15 hours per day, 6 days per week without vacations and to pay 50% taxes from any income during the last twenty years.
Secondly. Define the group or coalition of any candidate. If all your candidates are from one group, then voting order doesn’t matter so much. If your candidates are from different groups, then votting order matters.
In most situations, a candidate can represent a group and/or he’s a member of that group (political party, organization, union, cartel, conglomerat, coalition, mafia, whatever). In this scenario the collective thinking will work and no one will oppose the party. No matter what a single candidate will say, its important what entire group will say. Every group can have one or more candidates, like candidates from our 0.0 alliances, and actually it’s not so important for which one you’ll vote in a STV voting model. Means it’s not so important the voting order, if all candidates you choosed, are from one group:
Aryth > Merckelchen > Innominate > Xenuria > The Judge.
You can vote like this: Xenuria > Innominate > Aryth and your votes will be distributed between them. Therefore, in this case we ca get another quota winner.
In the third. Look at their election promise, how they are going to fulfil that promise step by step. Otherwise this is just a populism.
In the fourth. If the number of seats is very limited, then the voting order is very important, because a group can have only one candidate for a set and the favorite candidate should be first in that preference list. In this scenario it’s better to win by quota.
In the fifth. If you think that your favorite candidate can not win, then find another candidates from other groups, which have similar interests and build your voting order on this basis. But don’t share your vote to a candidate/group, which you don’t like what they are going to do.
I see your joke, but the:
are among the worst inventions of humanity.
who said i was joking? this bedamed vote system is the largest pile of stinking heresy i have ever read about…ie please vote…but your vote really does not count because the system can be game’d. Burn it.
Voting is inherently pointless as self interest is the worst reason to vote.
Actually, it wasn’t over a century ago. Arrow’s research was much, much more recent. Condorcet’s voting paradox is that old, but it was not a general result like Arrow’s (or even Nakamura’s). And it is not every election, just some of them. The result basically says that a group of people do not make decisions like an individual. So talking about “the will of the people” is ■■■■■■■■.
Uhhmmm…what? Ordinal or cardinal does not imply probabilistic. Probabilistic models are where voters are imperfectly informed about candidates and that candidates are imperfectly informed about voter preferences and their distribution. These imperfections are represented by probability distributions. Think of voters who later regret their vote.
That is not what probabilistic voting means. In the Downsian approach (which is where you find Arrow’s theorem and Nakamura’s Number) the candidates and voters have perfect knowledge. Probabilistic voting says that neither candidates nor voters have perfect information and as such there is some uncertainty in terms of which candidates they will vote for.
Perhaps you should try Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action. In that book he looks at how groups behave and set up rules, norms and so forth to ensure that members of the group work to achieve the goals of the group.
The book challenged accepted wisdom in Olson’s day that:
- if everyone in a group (of any size) has interests in common, then they will act collectively to achieve them; and
- in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannize and exploit the minority.
The book argues instead that individuals in any group attempting collective action will have incentives to “free ride” on the efforts of others if the group is working to provide public goods. Individuals will not “free ride” in groups that provide benefits only to active participants.
So even if HS players are a majority their problem is that they are disorganized and won’t all vote for the same candidate or even vote at all. Look at why Burn Jita still works. Players in HS are often insular and out of touch with the wider game. They are completely unorganized and the vast majority of them do not even know there is a CSM.
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