The moral right of integrity allows authors to prevent certain modifications to their artworks. … The right is generally conceived of as an intellectual property right, and characterized as a right to reputation or a personality right. ~ Oct. 11, 2007
### The Moral Right of Integrity: A Freedom of Expression by Kim …
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The Moral Right of Integrity: A Freedom of Expression
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT, Vol. 2, Fiona Macmillan, ed., Edward Elgar, 2006
32 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2007
College of Law and Business; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law
Abstract
The moral right of integrity allows authors to prevent certain modifications to their artworks.
The right is maintained by the author even where the ownership of the copyright in her work has passed out of her hands.
An example often used to illustrate the complexities of the right is Marcel Duchamp’s painting of a mustache on a replica of Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa.
The right is generally conceived of as an intellectual property right, and characterized as a right to reputation or a personality right.
By contrast,
the aim of this chapter is to develop the characterization of the integrity right in UK law as a human right of expression.
This chapter will situate the integrity right directly within the doctrine of freedom of expression,
and its principle of protection of speakers against distortion of their expression.
Two implications of the analysis may be seen.
Understood as a freedom of expression,
a section 80 claimant would not need to show injury.
Moreover,
while a copier’s defense of freedom of expression to a copyright infringement claim is sometimes viewed as brought from outside the doctrinal framework,
with section 80 both the claim and defense may be seen as partaking of the same doctrinal framework,
namely principles of freedom of expression.
Keywords: integrity right, moral rights, copyright, expression, free speech
JEL Classification: K11
Suggested Citation:
Treiger-Bar-Am, Kim, The Moral Right of Integrity: A Freedom of Expression. NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT, Vol. 2, Fiona Macmillan, ed., Edward Elgar, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019946
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New Directions in Copyright Law
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2. - :
Cheng-Davies, T. S. L. (2016). Honour in UK Copyright Law is Not ‘A
Trim Reckoning’ – Its Impact on the Integrity Right and the Destruction
of Works of Art. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 36(2), 272-303.
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Peer reviewed version
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Link to published version (if available):
10.1093/ojls/gqv024
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Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
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This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Oxford University Press at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqv024. Please refer to any applicable terms of use
of the publisher.
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University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
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3. - :
LSE Research Online
The LONDON SCHOOL
of ECONOMICS and
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Jonas Brown-Pedersen
The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights
Protection: A Comparative Study on the
Waivability of Rights and
Recontextualisation of Works in Copyright
and Droit D’auteurs Systems
Article (Published version)
(Refereed)
Original citation:
Brown-Pedersen, Jonas (2018) The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights Protection: A Comparative
Study on the Waivability of Rights and Recontextualisation of Works in Copyright and Droit
D’auteurs Systems. LSE Law Review, 3. pp. 115-128.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21953/lse.ir8b0i90x2l6
© 2018 LSE Law Society
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2018 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ LSE LAW REVIEW _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 115
The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights Protection: A
Comparative Study on the Waivability of Rights and
Recontextualisation of Works in Copyright and Droit
D’auteurs Systems
Jonas Brown-Pedersen*
ABSTRACT
The paper examines two aspects of UK moral rights protection, namely the waiver of rights
provided for under section 87(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’)
and the protection of copyright works from recontextualisation, in a comparative study. The
jurisdictions compared are the UK, Canada, and the Nordic Countries. The paper argues that
UK protection of authors’ moral rights are insufficient, chiefly due to the operation of section
87(2) CDPA and the lack of protection against recontextualisation (‘the spirit of the
Convention’). The purpose of comparison is to furnish alternative solutions existing under the
same international framework as the CDPA. In concluding, the paper finds that comparing the
copyright law system of the UK to the Canadian hybrid system and the Nordic droit d’auteurs
systems reveals a scale from least to most substantial protection of moral rights, with a greater
emphasis on protection of the spirit of the work in droit d’auteurs jurisdictions, as illustrated by
Swedish case law.
INTRODUCTION
International copyright law is, at its very core, a philosophical compromise. This
is no surprise: it is likely that all large, multilateral treaties are a result of some sort
of compromise between the philosophical schools followed by different Member
States, owing to the State-specific nature of law. These differences may turn out
to have little practical significance, or, as in the case of the 1886 Berne Convention
- Third year LLB student at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London
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4. - :
PROTECTING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
UNDER THE U.K.’S NEW
PERFORMANCES REGULATIONS
Robert C. Bird* and Lucille M. Ponte**
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
I. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MORAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . 217
II. CONTEMPORARY MORAL RIGHTS IN FRANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
III. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
IV. CONTEMPORARY MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES . 247
V. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.
LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282