Federation Peacekeepers/Nadire Security Consultants Report to Federation Combined Special Task Force 15 – Operation Prudence
Date: 16th February YC125/FC240
To: Federation Combined Special Task Force 15 Capsuleer Liaison, Federation Peacekeepers Command
CC: Intaki Assembly Intelligence, Durand, Arthur. Special Agent, Nadire District Office of Special Investigations, Federal Intelligence Office, Federation Marshals Service.
Subject Matter: Relocation of Intaki Member State Citizens to Syndicate and Syndicate Protectorate territories – Federation Peacekeeper involvement.
Classification Level: Restricted
Summary:
This report has been prepared to summarise the involvement of the Federation Peacekeepers and Nadire Security Consultants in the initiative put forward by Chatalain Auxiliary Response to transport human passengers into the Syndicate region.
Federation Peacekeepers and Nadire Security Consultants personnel were involved in the transportation of willing human passengers after stringent procedures were applied to separate those unwilling to go, or those with active criminal arrest warrants/persons of interest, to avoid aiding and abetting the facilitation of criminal/terrorist elements within and outside the Federation. Whilst not all contracts issued by Chatalain Auxiliary Response could be accepted by the Federation Peacekeepers, as many as possible were to ensure that if fugitives from justice were present, they could be intercepted and delivered to the appropriate authorities to see justice done.
Risk Assessment:
Advisers and Observers from the Federation Navy, Federation Marshals Service, Federal Intelligence Office, Intaki Assembly Intelligence, and the Nadire District Office of Special Investigations were invited to oversee all interviews interrogations, and debriefings to ensure compliance with Federal regulations concerning the application and ethics of the law, and the satisfaction of criminal arrest warrants where proof of identity was established.
Interrogations/Interviews were stressed to be a team effort and constant supervision between representatives of the agencies involved were implemented to avoid any breach of the duty of care held towards detainees. If improper conduct was witnessed, the interrogators involved were removed and prevented from resuming the interviews.
Interstellar Transportation always has inherent risks involved with its execution, but transit into the null-sector territories without the utilisation of a vessel equipped with a cynosaural jump drive requires further analysis of the route taken and what threats could be expected to mitigate risk to human life and Peacekeeper material. The shortest route was undertaken from Intaki to the Syndicate destination of M2-CF1 X - Moon 3 - Intaki Syndicate Bureau station, as it was deemed to be the most expedient to avoid remaining too long in Syndicate space noting the recent annexation of Syndicate space by Caldari State forces, as well as independent forces loyal to the Caldari State elsewhere in the region.
To facilitate transportation, a Bustard-class Deep Space Transport vessel from the Commonwealth Logistics Corporation, the Lady Charete II, under the command of Captain Malcolm Geffen, was chartered to facilitate the transportation. Transit was conducted without incident and those released arrived at their destination without undue delay or distress.
Methods of Interview and Interrogation:
Initial interviews consisted of identifying the individual and reconciling that identity with member state records. Conversations with the individual were employed throughout the process of interviewing to ascertain their motives for desiring to leave the Intaki member states, as well as recording their consent given where appropriate and where it was clearly of their own volition. All individuals were reminded of the inherent dangers of the Syndicate so that they clearly understood the potential risks of migrating to the region in line with Federal and Member State transit guidance, and that they travelled at their own risk.
Legal representation was provided at the expense of Federation Peacekeepers for everyone interviewed and they were all reminded of their right to have a lawyer or other advocate present throughout the procedures. Should the individual be deemed a person of interest or confirmed as having active warrants for their arrest, they were immediately advised that they would be detained for further questioning by the relevant authorities involved in this exercise. When this was deemed justified, interviews would alternate to the interrogation format.
Members of the Federal Intelligence Office, Federation Marshals Service, and the Intaki Judicial Services (primarily Intaki Assembly Intelligence) carried out exhaustive checks to ensure that those confirmed for transit to the Syndicate were not evading justice or involved in the events that transpired in Intaki in the last few years throughout the State occupation. Two interviewers were to be present with those selected for interrogation, with two observers from different agencies to ensure impartial oversight and compliance with agreed procedures. All interviewers and interrogators were reminded of Federal Principles in how they comported themselves throughout the process – if unethical or unlawful behaviour was suspected or witnessed, there was immediate intervention to remove the interrogators from play.
Interview and Interrogation Results:
Out of the 1,750 individuals interviewed and screened as part of Operation Prudence, approximately 112 were discovered to have active arrest warrants or were wanted for questioning in connection with allegations of criminality or misconduct relating to the events on Intaki. These individuals have been remanded into custody of the relevant authorities to ensure they do not evade justice for their crimes against the Intaki member states and the Federation. Amongst the identified criminal elements include several noted collaborators with the Lai Dai occupational force, Aenaebra Cult members, as well as members of local organised crime bodies. A member of the State Armed Forces was also identified, suspected to be part of their intelligence services, and has been transferred into the custody of the Federal Intelligence Office for debriefing.
Members of organisations identified as having been ‘anti-Assembly’ (refer to the Intaki Crisis historiography) and took part in acts against the perceived corruption of the Intaki Assembly during that period were not subject to detainment as it was majority-agreed between all parties that it was not in the public interest to attempt prosecution in light of ongoing civil unrest on Intaki. The objection of representatives of the Intaki Assembly Intelligence and Judicial Services was noted. They have subsequently been permitted transit to Syndicate without hindrance.
A further 588 individuals were identified as at-risk of human trafficking, having expressed second thoughts, or were coerced against their will into agreeing to travel to the Intaki Syndicate, either by their own admission outright and/or investigative measures undertaken by interviewers which led to the interviewee confirming that they were being transported against their will. The identity of these individuals has been officially redacted from this report and have been identified in separate documentation, with an increased security classification reflecting the sensitivity of this information, for reasons pertaining to personal safety and preservation of life and privacy. For those deemed to be in imminent threat to their lives, they have been placed under the protection of the Federation Peacekeepers in co-operation with the Federation Marshals Service and the Nadire Office of Special Investigations until such time as this threat diminishes.
Ethical and Legal Concerns:
We have ensured that Federation and Member State law (the latter where applicable) has been applied throughout the conduct of this Operation in dealing with non-Federation and non-Member State actors.
With those suspected and/or confirmed to have active arrest warrants at the Intaki District and/or Federal level, or indeed elsewhere, we have ensured that their rights as Federation citizens have been upheld and that they have been subjected to interrogatory procedures that comply with established guidelines set by the Federal Administration and Marshals Service. As aforementioned in the Risk Assessment, strict rules of conduct were applied throughout the process to those suspected of and those confirmed to have committed offences against Member State and Federal law in accordance with established convention and to avoid tainting the criminal justice proceedings with allegations of impropriety.
It is the concern of myself and others within the Peacekeepers and Consultancy that certain individuals within the groups publicly contracted for transportation to Syndicate were coerced into consenting to their travel – human trafficking. Consulting guidance regarding possible instances of extraordinary rendition and sections concerning fear for human rights abuses at their planned destination, these individuals suspected of, or indicated that they were being forced against their will, to transit to the Syndicate were detained under the pretences of additional questioning. Efforts were made to avoid the suspicion of their peers throughout this process of separation, especially for those deemed to fall into vulnerable persons categories. These individuals have been provided with official protection and where appropriate, new identities supplied.
In accordance with Federal privacy statutes, all parties involved are bound to not disclose the identities of those that chose to leave for the Syndicate in good legal standing, or those that have elected to remain within the Federation for the reasons identified above. This is imperative to ensure the protection of Federation citizens from persecution and/or reprisals. Should any party or representative involved in this operation breach this covenant either through wilful acts or reckless negligence, they shall be subject to severe penalties including criminal prosecution. It is noted that this prohibition on disclosure does not apply to confirmed criminal elements and those found guilty of charges arrayed against them.
Conclusion:
Operation Prudence has been judged to be a success from the original mission intent and execution. The co-operation between Member State and Federal bodies was as frictionless as they could possibly be for the majority of the operation, and this is to be commended as an example of inter-agency operational success. Unfortunately the Peacekeepers were unable to obtain more contracts, and thus it is unknown how many more have successfully slipped the net into the territory of the Intaki Syndicate. Whilst it may be possible to request extradition if they are identified, it is increasingly an impossibility with the current political climate favouring the Caldari State over the Federated Union. Nonetheless, I have confidence that one day those that have evaded justice today will eventually find themselves facing the consequences of their actions against the Federation and the good people of the Intaki Member States.
Sincerities,
Edward Adams
Commander
Federation Peacekeepers